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1. Introduction
The proliferation of private and multi-stakeholder public-private initiatives aiming to shape
business conduct by non-enforceable forms of regulation in order to limit adverse business impact
on society and promote sustainable global development has fascinated scholars from a range of
disciplines for decades. While private initiatives like the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have a
history of several decades, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) organised by public organisations are
more recent and pose more challenges to the literature on governance, regulation and Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). As evidenced by the UN Global Compact,
launched by the (then) Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), which is the world’s largest
international organisation whose members comprise most of the worlds’ States, the evolution of
transnational business governance schemes is not limited to private initiative. Indeed, with the
adoption of the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework in 2008 and its operationalisation
through the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the transnational
regulation of business impact on society has undergone significant evolution.
Although technically limited to the issue of human rights, the development of these UN instruments
have brought publicly initiated schemes strongly onto the stage, in practice reaching beyond human
rights. The UN Guiding Principles differ from both the UN Global Compact another important
recent regulatory MSI CSR scheme, the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility Guidance Standard:
unlike the Global Compact, they explicitly connect State law and private regulation; and unlike ISO
26000, which like many other business governance schemes was launched by a private
organisation,2 the Principles were developed from within a public international organisation. In
terms of regulatory governance, the UN Guiding Principles are a novelty which connects elements
of the state-centered international law not only to national law and legal institutions, but also to the
forces of the market which drives many of the non-state business governance initiatives (Cashore
2002) in order to gain maximum influence on business conduct. The Principles comprise three
complementary ‘pillars’: (1) the State Duty to Protect against human rights infringements at the
horizontal level between individuals; (2) the Corporate Responsibility to Respect, which comprises
both compliance with applicable laws and respect for social expectations of business organisations;
(3) Access to Remedy, which implies that appropriate and effective remedies should be made
available to alleged victims by States as well as by business organisations.
The Guiding Principles have already had significant influence on several other public and private
business governance instruments, including the Global Compact, OECD’s Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, ISO 26000 as well as EU and national law and policy. With limited own
specific implementation modalities, the Guiding Principles also interact with the Global Compact,
ISO 26000, OECD’s Guidelines, EU policy and law and national law for their implementation. The
way in which the Guiding Principles as a publicly initiated multi-stakeholder initiative on business
governance has claimed the stage potentially changes prospects for sustainability oriented
transnational regulation of business governance. Maximising this potential may be improved
through understanding of the interactional aspects.
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The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is an independent, non-governmental organization Umade up
of members from the national standards bodies of 163 countries. According to its website, ISO is the world’s largest
developer of voluntary International Standards (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about_governance.htm and
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm, last accessed 13 September 2013).

This article adds to this knowledge by discussing the Guiding Principles from the perspective of the
Transnational Business Governance Interaction (TBGI) framework (Eberlein et al. 2014). The
article shows that the Guiding Principles have worked around the political and institutional
constraints of state-centred international law by actively involving or ‘enrolling’ private non-state
actors in the development of business governance norms, and by ‘piggy-backing’ onto other
transnational business governance schemes for their implementation.
With its main focus on the Guiding Principles, the article takes its empirical point of departure in an
initiative which has been organised within a public regulatory setting. In adopting a public
regulatory perspective to regulatory business governance and CSR, it follows the line of the
sustainability ‘orchestration’ literature (e.g. Schleifer 2013, Abbott & Snidal 2013, Verbruggen
2013). More specifically, the UN Guiding Principles are examined as a type of transnational law.
The analysis provides an intergovernmental and therefore, by implication, state-based perspective to
the TBGI literature.
The article contributes to efforts to understanding the interaction between private and public
regulation as governance modalities to shape business conduct to reduce adverse impact on society.
It contributes to the literature on regulation and governance by discussing and explaining aspects of
the UN Guiding Principles, a CSR instrument that has so far not been much discussed in this
literature from the perspective of governance and transnational interaction (compare, however,
Wood 2012, Muchlinski 2012). This contributes to discussions on the Guiding Principles and their
precursor, the UN Framework, in the business ethics literature, which has focused on the moral
background and possible conflicts between the legal and philosophical dimensions (Fasterling and
Demuijnck 2013, Cragg 2012, Bernaz 2012, McCorquedale 2009, Wettstein 2009).
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the background that motivates the analysis of the
Guiding Principles from the TBGI perspective. 2.1 introduces the political and regulatory backdrop
to the Guiding Principles and sketches their interaction with other business governance schemes of
a transnational character. 2.2 offers a literature review and draws up some challenges which the
Guiding Principles pose to existing scientific knowledge. With a particular focus on transnational
law, 2.3 describes the pragmatic approach adopted by the article to discuss transnational regulatory
developments with legal implications. Section 3 sketches the TBGI analytical framework (3.1) and
explains the methodology (3.2), focusing on key definitional issues and elements for the purposes
of the current subject. Section 4 is the analysis of the Guiding principles from the TBGI perspective.
4.1 offers an overview of the Guiding Principles highlighting interactional aspects in their
formation and implementation. 4.2 discusses dimensions of interaction and components of
regulatory governance. 4.2.1 explains the background for the Guiding Principles with particular
focus on the goal and agenda setting for transnational business governance through the UN. 4.2.2
examines TBGI dimensions and components of the Guiding Principles with regard to rule formation
and 4.2.3 with regard to implementation. 4.2.4 briefly describes monitoring and information
gathering, compliance promotion and enforcement, and evaluation and review, suggesting issues of
transnational business governance interaction that may evolve as the Guiding Principles and their
interaction with other TBG institutions mature. Section 5 concludes that the UN Guiding Principles
are unique in several respects of relevance transnational business governance interaction, and show
the relevance of the TBGI approach to public regulatory transnational business governance
initiatives. In terms of regulatory perspectives targeting business governance, section 5 notes that
the analysis of the Guiding Principles as interactional transnational business governance suggests
that this form of governance is capable of migrating from private governance to becoming adopted

by public institutions as a means towards regulating global sustainability concerns. This conclusion
complements related findings (Webb 2012) in relation to ISO 26000, which by contrast to the
Guiding Principles started as a private regulatory governance initiative.
2. Motivation and general theoretical approach
2.1. The Guiding Principles and their influence on other business governance schemes
2011 was a year of ‘fast-forward’ movement in terms of public international regulation of business
as regards their impact on society. With the Human Rights Council’s adoption of the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, the controversial issue of business responsibilities for
human rights found a resolution, which soon left its imprint on other CSR regulation. Already in
May 2011, based on a draft of the Guiding Principles and their predecessor, the UN Protect,
Respect and Remedy Framework (UN 2008a, ‘the UN Framework’), the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) revised its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(OECD 2011a). The EU Commission responded by revising its definition of CSR to accord with the
Guiding Principles and the OECD Guidelines. It also adopted the Guiding Principles’
recommendation for ‘smart-mix’ regulation, which entails a mixture of hard and soft law and other
modalities intended to affect business conduct, such as guidance and incentives. In doing so, the
2011 EU Communication on CSR (EU 2011) underscored the role which the Guiding Principles
playing in informing other public initiatives towards regulating CSR. This role had been visible also
in chapters of social issues in the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility Guidance Standard (ISO 2010),
which had been adopted in 2010 as an MSI instrument based on collaboration between business,
governments, labour organisations, civil society, academics and other stakeholders.3 The Human
Rights chapter of ISO 26000 was influenced by the UN Framework, as was a 2012 revision of the
International Finance Corporation Performance Standards on Environmental and Social
Sustainability (IFC 2012a). A member of the World Bank Group, IFC provides investment services
to promote development in emerging economies and help reduce poverty. The Performance
Standards provide guidance for IFC’s clients on how to identify risks and impacts. (IFC website).
A field once held to be voluntary action, CSR is increasingly coming to be subjected to public
regulation. This takes place through regulatory modalities ranging from soft to hard public law as
well as incentives and reporting (Buhmann 2013a and forthcoming, Ioannou & Serafeim 2012).
Combining approaches of legal and organisational scholarship, the Transnational Business
Governance Interactions (TBGI) framework proposed by Eberlein and others (2014) has been
offered as an approach to conceptualisation and analysis of schemes applying non-state authority to
govern business conduct across borders. Given that initiatives to regulate CSR are not, however,
limited to non-state schemes, the scholarly need to understand interactional aspects of MSI schemes
that emanate from public organisations is significant to fill the knowledge gap on the evolution and
effects of such schemes. Similarly, in view of the influence that the Guiding Principles have already
had on other CSR instruments, it is pertinent to understand how that instrument interacts with other
instruments which promote or work through the exercise of ‘private authority’.
2.2. Challenges to existing knowledge
A plethora of private or public-private codes of conduct, process guidelines and reporting schemes
have emerged in later decades to guide companies towards managing and limiting their adverse
3
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impact on society. With national and particularly international policy and law-makers following, the
‘voluntary’-‘mandatory’ dichotomy, which has marked much debate on CSR, is increasingly
becoming obsolete (Mares 2012). Instead, business ethics oriented organisational, political science
and legal scholars are seeking to understanding how public authorities are engaging in regulating
CSR and by what modalities such regulation, which is often non-enforceable, works. Knudsen and
Moon (2013), Fasterling and Demuijnck (2013); Scherer and Palazzo (2011) Knudsen (2011) and
Matten and Moon (2008) theorize on ways in which public or public-private MSI regulatory
activities affect CSR activities in companies. Organisational CSR research has undergone a shift in
emphasis on CSR as based mainly on business interests and ‘doing well by doing good’ ( Porter &
Kramer 2006, Smith 2005, Moon 2004, Berman et al. 1999) towards greater recognition of CSR as
a measure to address public policy interests. Matten and Moon’s (2008) implicit-explicit CSR
recognises that company conduct, especially in Europe, is influenced by governmental objectives.
With the emergence of the UN Global Compact and other initiatives, organisational literature has
taken to analysing how governments and intergovernmental organisations address CSR and what
causes authorities to adopt measures to promote business self-regulation to minimise adverse impact
on society (Rasche 2010, Margula & Steurer 2009, Reich 2007, Moon 2004, Haufler 2001). In their
extensive discussion of the new political role of business in a globalized world, Scherer and Palazzo
(2011) demonstrate that the division of tasks between governments and business is giving way to a
more integrated approach in which companies not only assume social responsibilities that go
beyond legal requirements, but also assume responsibilities which are basically of a political nature,
in order to address governance gaps. The UN Guiding Principles have escaped much of this
discussion as an instrument which functions through both public and private governance to
influence business conduct.
Legal scholars have sought to grasp the soft, transnational and often public-private character of
CSR-related regulatory initiatives that tends to fall between conventionally recognised categories of
public or private, national or international law. In contexts of business economics and corporate
governance legal scholars have long discussed the justification for managers’ engagement in CSR
(Berle 1931, Dodd 1932, Berle & Means 1932, Teubner 1985). More recently, international law
oriented scholars have particularly taken to analysing the way in which CSR and public-private MSI
initiatives are affecting boundaries between the public and the private regulatory sphere. Eberlein
and others (2014), Krisch and Kingsbury (2006), Lobel (2005), Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart
(2005), Backer (2006) and Joerges, Sand and Teubner (2004) recognise that a blurring of
boundaries between public and private, international and national law as well as politics and
governance is occurring and theorise on implications for understanding interaction across those
boundaries. Direct or implicit critique against the UN Guiding Principles thrives in both the
organisational and legal literature (Fasterling and Demuijnck 2013, Deva (forthcoming), Bernaz
2012, Cragg 2012, Knox 2012, Mares 2012). However, so far, little analysis has been made of the
interactional character and other features of the Guiding Principles that may allow this publicly
initiated MSI initiative specifically targeting business impact on society to push change.
Scherer and Palazzo (2011) argue that current theorizing on the firm in the CSR literature has not
yet sufficiently integrated the new political role of private business, explaining that much of the
literature pursues an instrumental view of CSR and builds on an economic paradigm which
advocates a strict separation of political and economic domains. The ‘political CSR’ perspective
proposed by those authors “suggests an extended model of governance with business firms
contributing to global regulation and providing public goods” (2011:900-901). Scherer and Palazzo
(2011) recognise debates in legal studies, including the impact of globalisation on the regulatory

power of state institutions, the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private, and the
difficulty of international organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) in filling governance gaps resulting from state’s lack of will or capacity to
honour their obligations. They also recognise that with private and lower-level public actors and
multi-stakeholder initiatives seeking to fill the governance gaps arising from the incapacity of
international organisations and nation states, global governance is emerging as a new form of
transnational regulation.
Governance gaps are precisely what have led political scientists to emphasise the impact of weak
governance and the need for more effective public guidance or hard regulation of company conduct
to limit adverse effects on society (Ruggie 2004, Ruggie 2007). Contrary to the discussions in much
of the above literature, the 2008 UN Framework and the 2011 Guiding Principles address
governance gaps specifically in terms of governments’ omission of fulfilling their obligations under
international and sometimes national law. By combining governmental duties (to protect against
human rights violations, including but not only through national law) and business responsibility (to
respect human rights, including through compliance with national law), the Guiding Principles seek
to address the conditions of weak governance which allow business organisations to infringe on
human rights. Simultaneously, the Guiding Principles play on other transnational business
governance instruments for their implementation. The Guiding Principles offer a timely case for
both contributing to filling the gap in the literature in terms of the interplay between public and
private business governance, and providing the literature with enhanced insight into this instrument.
2.3. A pragmatic transnational law approach
In discussing the Guiding Principles as an example of transnational business governance, this article
adopts the pragmatic approach within legal scholarship. Pragmatism as a scholarly approach allows
for recognising observable facts even if these differ from doctrine (for example, the very limited
role of business organisations in international law). In a legal context, a pragmatic approach entails
arguments or analyses which stress the usefulness or expediency of particular actions or legal
institutions, focusing on solving problems of reality rather than delving into abstract conflicts based
in theory and doctrine (Tamanaha 1997). Because they cut across established and even ‘carefully
policed boundaries’ (Trubek 2004:322) both in terms of legal and other social science theory and
national territory, global social and environmental concerns do call for innovative approaches. In
turn, this calls for a pragmatic approach, which for the purposes of the current article entails
recognition of the blurring of boundaries between the public and private legal and policy domains,
rather than a questioning of it.
Buying into the pragmatic approach to international law, some scholarly approaches recognise an
increasing transnationalisation of international law. Transnational law applies to or involves public
and private actors, often of an international respectively multinational character, and also often
operates across the boundaries of national or regional legal systems. Transnational law merges
elements of conventional public (international, regional, and sometimes even national) law and
conventional private law as well as new forms of law and rule-making, including private selfregulation, such as corporate or sector-wise codes of conduct for companies with transnational
operations (Zumbansen 2012, Koh 1997:2626-2627). Transnationalisation of law is partly a result
of the fact that markets have internationalised while governments remain by definition bound by
their borders. International law is becoming transnationalised when it relates to issues that used to
be subject to private or national regulation, often in an effort to remedy governance gaps resulting
from the inability by national legal systems to adequately regulate transnational business and its

social impact. From this perspective, the Guiding Principles may be considered a type of
transnational law, which builds on conventional international law but goes beyond this in seeking to
regulate business conduct across territorial borders.
Transgressing boundaries between public and private, national and international law, transnational
law differs from the ‘stateless law’ that Gunther Teubner (1997, 2000) has discussed: stateless law
skirts the state and suggests that the state is becoming insignificant for regulatory purposes with
regard to transnational activities of the private sector; transnational law by contrast recognises a role
for states and organisations created by states (intergovernmental organisations) in a regulating
concerns of a transnational character that often involves private actors.
3. Analytical framework: Transnational Business Governance Interactions
3.1. The TBGI framework
The TBGI framework proposed by Eberlein et al. (2014) offers a matrix for analysis of interaction
across six dimensions of interaction and six components of regulatory governance. The full matrix
provides a detailed mapping of interaction: who or what interacts, divers and shapers, mechanisms
and pathways, character of interaction, effects of interaction and change over time; in combination
with the components: goal/agenda setting, rule formation, implementation, monitoring and
information gathering, compliance promotion and enforcement, and evaluation and review
(Eberlein et al. 2014: 7). The dynamics may be explored at diverse levels of detail, focusing on
selected aspects of interaction or mapping all aspects of interaction (as illustrated by Eberlein et al.
with regard to forest governance (2014:15)).
The TBGI framework has been proposed as an analytical framework for identifying and analysing a
series of dimensions of interaction comprising various components of regulatory governance.
Through identification and analysis of interaction between dimensions of interaction and
components of regulatory governance, the TBGI framework “allows scholars to investigate the
drivers, forms, causal mechanisms, and pathways of [transnational business governance], as well as
effects on regulatory capacity, performance and outcomes”. The theory based point of departure for
the framework is the definition of transnational business governance (TBG) as “systematic efforts
to regulate business conduct that involve a significant degree of non-state authority in the
performance of regulatory functions across national borders” (Eberlein et al. 2014:3).
Only some of the key elements of the definition have been explained for the purposes of the TBGI
analytical framework. ‘Transnational’ refers to arrangements across borders which involve
“significant non-state authority” (Eberlein et al. 2014: 3). What is understood by ‘non-state’ or
‘significant authority’ is not made explicit, leaving the elaboration open. By contrast, ‘state’ is
understood to “denote all institutions of the state, including international, supranational, and transgovernmental structures” (2013: 3). In other words, international organizations like the UN and the
OECD are included in principle. ‘Business’ indicates commercial activity. It is this activity that is
being ’regulated’ under TBGI schemes. ‘Governance’ actually refers to ‘regulatory governance’,
that is governance through state or non-state regulation in terms of “organized and sustained
attempts to change the behavior of target actors to further at collective end, through rules or norms
or means of implementation and enforcement” (2013: 3 with reference to Held & Held 2011 and
Levi-Faur 2013).

Despite the definition’s emphasis on non-state authority, the TBGI framework has been applied to
sustainability or CSR related issues with a strong public governance element, such as EU regulation
of forestry legality (Overdevest & Zeitlin 2014) and state responses to non-state certification
programmes (Guldbrandsen 2014). Indeed, in introducing the TBGI framework Eberlein et al.
(2014: 3) recognize that TBGI schemes may involve a range of heterogeneous actors, such as
individuals, technical experts, political entrepreneurs, NGOs, business organizations and
government agencies. While they do not make explicit what is understood by ‘significant non-state
authority’, they explain that the framework is applied to initiatives in which non-state actors
exercise such authority either alone or with state actors (Eberlein et al. 2014: 3, emphasis added).
The TBGI framework focuses on interactions between actors and schemes, and between schemes
and state institutions. Interactions may be within a sector or across sectors. They may be
“symmetrical or asymmetrical, antagonistic or synergistic, intentional or unintentional” (Eberlein et
al. 2014: 3-4).
It is this interactional focus that makes it interesting to apply the TBGI perspective to the UN
Guiding Principles. Due to their combination of state-based rules and institutions and their aim to
regulate business activities across territorial and sector-specific boundaries, the Guiding Principles
constitute a unique development in transnational business governance. Initiated within a quasilegislative body4 under an international organization, the Guiding Principles are interactional across
institutions and state and non-state authority both in their background and normative sources, and
for their implementation and influence. Several key instruments, which as noted above have been
influenced by the Guiding Principles and their precursor, the UN Framework, have TBGI features.
This applies to ISO 26000 (Webb 2012), as well as the Global Compact, the IFC Performance
Standards and the 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Lacking
enforcement modalities of their own and detailed implementation structures, the Guiding Principles
also draw on procedural elements under those other TBGI schemes for their own implementation as
regards business governance.
3.2. Methodology
Acknowledging that transnational business governance interactions involve heterogeneous actors
and vary as regards interests pursued, values and other foundational aspects (Eberlein et al. 2014: 34), the TBGI framework allows for a degree of flexibility as regards analysis of the dimensions,
components and dynamics. The TBGI model’s appeal to scholars from diverse fields of regulatory
governance naturally invites as diverse methods to be applied. The current article analyses the
Guiding Principles from the pragmatic approach to transnational law indicated above, focusing
particularly at the ways in which the Guiding Principles were evolved through interaction between
public and private actors involved in the rule formation process and the implementation of the
Guiding Principles through interaction with other transnational business governance instruments.
The method is document study applying the legal method of document study to identify sources of
law, including law-in-the-making, and legal (reflexive law informed) discourse analysis. The former
4

The UN Human Rights Council has preparatory functions for international human rights law which is formally
adopted by the UN General Assembly. That and its ability to develop resolutions that endorse other soft law instruments
provide it with a quasi-legislative role. For reference to the Council as quasi-legislative, see also Ruggie, John (2013)
Just Business, W.W. Norton & Company, at xiii. The same applied to the Council’s predecessor, the Commission on
Human Rights, which drafted the first mandate of the SRSG on Business and Human Rights, and which debated and
rejected the Draft Norms on Business and Human Rights, which had been developed by an expert Sub-Commission
under that Commission.

entails the legal method of studying legislative history including informing policy objectives, and
similarly as regards implementation. The latter entails a legal discourse analytical take on the
construction of business responsibilities for human rights through the process that led to the UN
Framework on which the Guiding Principles and their implementation build [details to be provided,
see comments in footnote].5 This method entails a close reading of documents and analysis of
interaction and interdiscursivity between documents and the way in which involved actors deploy
these strategically to influence other actors towards sensitivisation and agreement on specific
interests (Buhmann 2012a, Buhmann 2013b).
In this article, the TBGI dimensions are understood as follows: ‘Who and what interacts’ are the
institutions (private, public including inter-governmental organisations and their sub-institutions,
such as the UN Human Rights Council, and civil society) and key individuals holding specific
institutional tasks (in casu, the holder of the mandate as the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights (‘SRSG’), John Ruggie).6 ‘Drivers and shapers’
are understood as the background interests that actors pursued or which motivated actors to engage
in the interaction. By ‘mechanisms and pathways’ this article understands the specific
communicative modalities, including networks, discursive strategies and technical forms of
communication. ‘Character of interaction’ is the degree of competition, co-optation, chaos or
alignment between interacting instruments or institutions, whereas the ‘effects of interaction’ is the
result, and ‘change over time’ in this article focuses on normative change in the concept and
regulatory directives on business responsibilities for human rights.
4. The UN Guiding Principles: Interactional aspects of regulatory governance
4.1. Overview
The background to the Guiding Principles was a series of failed efforts within the UN to establish
an instrument to regulate business impact on society, followed by the success of the immediately
preceding initiative. The first major and comprehensive effort by an international organisation to
develop an instrument to regulate business conduct stretched from the 1970s into the 1990s. Drafted
by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, the draft UN Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations7 had been intended to prescribe duties for transnational corporations
(TNCs) to respect host countries’ development goals, observe their domestic law, respect
fundamental human rights, and observe consumer and environmental protection objectives. In 1998
an expert group under a Sub-Commission under the UN Commission on Human Rights set about to
draft guidance for business conduct with regard to human rights. The final version, the draft Norms
5
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It is important to note that John Ruggie, who is also an academic and Professor at Harvard University, developed the
Guiding Principles and their predecessor, the UN Framework, in his capacity as holder of the UN mandate. Thus,
although the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles are sometimes referred to as the ‘Ruggie Framework’ and the
‘Ruggie Principles’, they are not the brainchild of an academic in his academic capacity that might be unrelated to the
overall political and regulatory governance context, but of a holder of a UN mandate who was charged with a specific
set of tasks that arose precisely on the background of that context and were set out in resolutions by the UN
Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council (UN 2005, UN 2008b respectively).
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on Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
(UN 2003), was debated by the Commission for Human Rights in 2004 and 2005. Due to political
disagreements between States, which were members of the Commission, the Draft Norms failed to
generate sufficient support for recognition. The Commission instead recommended that the UN
Secretary General appoint a Special Representative to deal with the issue of business and human
rights (UN 2005). The mandate was charged upon Professor John Ruggie as Special Representative
of the Secretary-General. In June 2008 the UN Human Rights Council (which in 2006 succeeded
the Commission on Human Rights) ‘unanimously welcomed’ the Protect, Respect, Remedy
Framework (UN 2008a), commonly referred to as ‘the UN Framework’ or, sometimes, ‘the Ruggie
Framework’. A second mandate (UN 2008b), asking John Ruggie to ‘operationalise’ the
framework, resulted in the Guiding Principles (UN 2011a).
For development of both the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles, the SRSG and his team
engaged in broad consultations involving intergovernmental organisations, state representatives,
civil society, business organisations, and academics (for details, Knox 2012, Buhmann 2012a).
Soon after the adoption of the Guiding Principles, the UN Global Compact website on guidance for
the Compact’s human rights principles (Principles 1 and 2) was updated to refer to the UN Guiding
Principles (Global Compact website). A link to and explanation of the UN Framework had been
uploaded to the Global Compact website in 2008. Already before the formal endorsement of the
Guiding Principles, the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles (in their November 2010 draft
version) were taken into consideration by the OECD in the revision of the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, which was adopted in Paris in May 2011 (OECD 2011a). The revision
included a full new Chapter on Human Rights; an integration of the Due Diligence approach of the
Guiding Principles not only to human rights but also to other issue areas covered by the Guidelines;
and a revision of the ‘National Contact Points’ (NCP) complaints mechanism in accordance with
the Guiding Principles’ procedural standards for remedies. The OECD Guidelines are
recommendations addressed by governments to MNEs operating in or from adhering countries.8
The territorial scope of the Guidelines means that companies may be subjected to grievances in
front of home state NCPs for actions committed even in non-OECD states. Addressing both parent
companies and local entities within a MNE, the Guidelines provide non-binding principles for
enterprises with the aim of promoting positive contributions by enterprises to economic, social and
environmental progress (OECD 2011a, Chapter 1).
Relationships between the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility (SR) Guidance Standard and the
Guiding Principles are more complex. On the one hand, the section on human rights was aligned
with the UN framework on the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, relating to the due
diligence concept elaborated by the latter (clause 6.3). On the other hand, the influence was narrow
as to the contentious issue of an organisation’s ‘sphere of influence’. The concept of ‘sphere of
influence’, which has also been employed by the Global Compact since its launch and was also
included in the Draft UN Norms, was the object of considerable attention and research by the
SRSG’s work during his 2005-2008 mandate. This led to a rejection of the concept in favour of a
process which the SRSG termed Human Rights Due Diligence (UN 2008a, 2008c). The SRSG and
his team argued that it would be counterproductive to apply the concept of ‘sphere of influence’ to
ISO 26000, characterizing the concept as ambiguous, misleading, morally flawed, and susceptible
to strategic gaming. The final version of ISO 26000 was amended in an effort to accommodate
8
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these objections (Wood 2011). ISO 26000 does not apply the concept to organisations’ impact but
retained the concept in relation to what the Guiding Principles refer to as ‘leverage’ (an
organisation’s capacity to influence other organizations’ decisions). Indeed, as SRSG John Ruggie
(who had also been instrumental in the establishment of the Global Compact) had recognized that
the concept of ‘sphere of influence’ can be useful in other contexts that the corporate responsibility
to respect human rights, for which he rejected it (UN2008a). This suggests that the Guiding
Principles interact with other transnational business governance instruments in diverse ways. The
subsequent sections investigate this interaction with particular focus on two components of
interactions: rule formation and implementation (4.2.2 and 4.2.3). In order to set the context,
dimensions of interaction framing the goal and agenda-setting are briefly set out (4.2.1). This is
done with a particular focus on the global governance challenges (Ruggie 2013, 2014) and
interactional process that formed the foundation for the rule formation process of the Guiding
Principles and their implementation. The components of monitoring and information gathering,
compliance promotion and enforcement, and evaluation and review are only briefly indicated
(4.2.4), mainly to suggest future perspectives for both practice and research. Due to the novelty of
the Guiding Principles these components are not yet very evolved.
4.2. Dimensions of interaction and components of regulatory governance
4.2.1. Background to the Guiding Principles: Goal and agenda setting for transnational business
governance through the UN
As indicated, the Guiding Principles operationalise the UN Framework on Business and Human
Rights. The two therefore at an overall level share the same goal and contribute to the same general
agenda setting. But the UN Framework which broke the ground for the Guiding Principles’ explicit
and detailed transnational business governance within UN of a transnational law type
approximating conventional international law. The UN Framework also differed from the UN
Global Compact, which was also a groundbreaker in terms of establishing guidance for business,
but does so in a much softer fashion which builds on voluntary business commitment.
An activity initiated under the UN Human Rights Council, the overall goal of the Guiding
Principles on which the Guiding Principles build is to contribute to sustainable development in
accordance with the UN’s objective as stated in the UN Charter article 1.9 The UN Charter was
drafted in the conventional state-centrist international law context, in which business organizations
hold no place as bearers of duties. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was
developed to spell out the substantive contents of the human rights that the UN Charter refers to in a
general way, in its preamble makes reference to ‘all organs of society’. In 1948 when the Universal
Declaration was adopted, businesses were not thought to be included among such organs (Henkin
1999: 24-25; Mayer 2009). Nor is it likely that anyone fathomed that within a few decades would
business organizations be so economically and politically powerful as to pose significant risk to
human rights in a way that would not be easily regulated under the law of their home state.
As an operationalisation of the UN Framework, the Guiding Principles in terms of their more
immediate goal and agenda refer back to the UN Framework and the objective of the SRSG’s first
9
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mandate.10 This came about in part as a result of the attention increasingly paid by the UN to the
capacity of business organizations to cause human rights violations. This owes much to civil society
organizations, such as global Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) like Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch as well as numerous regional and local NGOs. These actors have played
a key role in getting the issue on to the agenda of the UN, eventually leading to the Guiding
Principles through the establishment of the SRSG’s 2005-2008 mandate and the preceding debates
on the Draft UN Norms. Some sustainability oriented business organizations, such as the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and Business for Social Responsibility
(BSR) have also played a role in this respect. Especially since the late1990s such organizations as
well as academics and some governments had interacted to convince policymakers and international
regulators of the necessity of developing a transnational normative framework with the capacity to
govern business conduct, especially but not only where a company’s home country is not the same
as the country in which it causes adverse social impact (Bendell 2004).
A combination of the limitations of the conventional system of international law and the actors’
interests, values, perceptions and resources were at play, working as drivers and shapers.
Constraining the adverse impact of multinational enterprises on society presented a particular
challenge to the UN as an international organization with a state-centrist structure. Based on the
conventional (Westphalian) conception of international law, UN rule-making tends to address
states. International law-making in the human rights field in particular is constituted by obligations
for states, and rights for individual persons. Nothing technically impedes international law to
regulate companies, but as evidenced by the fate of the Draft UN Code of Conduct and the Draft
UN Norms, political will among states as international law-makers has been limited in terms of
introducing binding requirements on companies to regulate their conduct and its environmental and
social impact. Sustainability related obligations on companies have been introduced in a limited
number of areas, in particular in the environmental field.11 Where the Draft UN Norms had failed,
the UN Framework succeeded and created the basis for the Guiding Principles. The Norms failed
partly because of antagonism caused by the treaty-like language that led to lobbying by some large
business organisations, and perhaps also due to limited insight into the often protracted international
law-making process and its many steps towards a fully-fledged treaty (Kinley and Nolan 2007,
Buhmann 2012b). The UN Framework was accepted partly due to the innovative and inclusive
multi-stakeholder process, partly because the insistence by the SRSG to refer to it as a ‘policy
framework’ although in effect much of its contents has a soft law character. The novel transnational
business governance framework offered by this approach allowed for agreement across past
antagonism and across the intellectual and political boundaries of state-centrist international law.
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Politically it would be difficult for the actors who had supported the Framework and adopted the
Resolution which asked the SRSG to ‘operationalise’ the Framework not to adopt the resulting
Guiding Principles (De Schutter forthcoming). This allowed for the adoption of a transnational
business governance instrument, which departed from the ‘policy’ title of the UN Framework by
taking a step ‘back’ into conventional international soft law speak by adopting a name – ‘Principles’
– which resonates with other international soft law instruments. This is an interesting example of
the dynamics at play, which also involved an interaction between politics and law in terms of
practice as well as theory: The ‘policy’ title of the UN Framework exemplifies the SRSG’s
pragmatic approach to the highly politicized character of the evolution of potential business duties
for human rights under international law. By referring to the UN Framework as a policy instrument,
its character was discursively ‘de-legalized’ and therefore de-politicized. This made its broad
acceptance by actors easier, also among both states and business representatives that had been
opposed to the Draft UN Norms (Buhmann 2012b). Once the UN Framework was broadly accepted,
the basis was in place for a formal adoption of the operationalization mandate (UN 2008b). Having
accepted the UN Framework (even as a ‘policy instrument’), the UN Human Rights Council was set
on a course towards also accepting the operationalization. Naming the operationalization document
– the Guiding Principles – by a recognised form of international soft law was a bold step by the
SRSG in that it might have generated resistance like the UN Norms, but having created a sound
political basis, the reception of the soft law term was completely different in this case.
The mechanisms and pathways applied by the SRSG and other actors to establish the goal and set
the agenda involved interest-based networks and discursive strategies. This has been described in
detail by Buhmann in her analysis of the discursive construction of the UN Framework and
evolution of background for the Guiding Principles (2012a, 2012b, 2013b). Related networking and
strategies has been applied with success in other sustainability contexts, including some related to
business governance (Reinalda 2001, Hajer 1995). In the context of business and human rights,
these networks and strategies generated acceptance of the need for a transnational business
governance instrument that had the authority of the UN and responded to global social expectations
of business conduct not only in compliance with applicable law but also with business ethics or
CSR.
As regards character of interaction (as defined by Eberlein et al. 2014: 16), the UN Framework
process came to develop a degree of coordination towards an agenda in a way that combined
diverse interests within an overall goal of reducing the risk of business related human rights
violations. This was very different from the Draft UN Norms that had been marked by competition
and chaos (Kinley, Nolan and Zerial 2007). Initially, interaction between civil society and some
business organizations involved in the development of the UN Framework had carried over
competition from the UN Norms process. Later, this gave way to some coordination involving
different stakeholder types and groups, with acceptance induced by the SRSG’s discursive
articulation of diverse stakeholders’/actors’ specific interests (Buhmann 2012b). The effect of
interaction was the creation of an acceptance among international policy-makers in the UN Human
Rights Council and among business and civil society organizations of the need for a transnational
business governance instrument on human rights. This ensured collaboration rather than
antagonistic counter-action throughout the SRSG’s second mandate, and therefore facilitated the
process that eventually led to the Guiding Principles.
From the launch of the draft UN Code of Conduct via the debate of the Draft UN Norms through
the UN Framework to the Guiding Principles a significant change over time took place. While in all

of these cases, there was broad although not universal support for the launch of the process to
develop a transnational business governance instrument, only the UN Framework and Guiding
Principles processes were successful towards delivering an output that was accepted. A number of
institutional factors differ, such as the geopolitical agenda (which in the case of the Draft Code of
Conduct between the 1970s to the early 1990s shifted form a North-South conflict under influence
of the Cold War and the New International Economy agenda to a geopolitical context informed by
the end of the Cold War and new geopolitical constellations and trends in economic growth and
investment) and the body that initiated the process. In the case of the Draft UN Norms, this was an
expert body under the politically composed UN Human Rights Commission, in the case of the UN
Framework the UN Secretary-General based on recommendations by the Human Rights
Commission, and in the case of the Guiding Principles the new UN Human Rights Council, a
politically composed body having succeeded the Commission, and which had already adopted the
UN Framework.
The rejection of the Draft UN Norms by the Commission for Human Rights led the Commission to
the adoption of the first SRSG mandate. This step by itself reflected an acceptance of the goal and
agenda of a process of developing a transnational business governance instrument on human rights
to reduce business related human rights abuse, probably combined with a political desire to be in
charge of the process and the agenda setting rather than leaving it to human rights law experts and
conventional ways of drafting international human rights law. This part of the agenda setting
objective is reflected in the SRSG’s mandate (UN 2005), which explicitly called on the mandate
holder to involve and consult with not only ‘the usual suspects’ of international human rights lawmaking – governments, intergovernmental organisations and human rights NGOs – but also to
involve business. That mandate led to the UN Framework, which in turn created the background for
the SRSG’s second mandate and the specific interactional rule formation process that resulted in the
Guiding Principles.
Having set the backdrop, the subsequent sections looks specifically at the Guiding Principles,
starting with interaction towards rule formation.
4.2.2. Rule formation
As regards who and what interacted in the process that created the Guiding Principles, the Guiding
Principles are the result of an unusual interaction between the UN Human Rights system and nonstate actors. The SRSG adopted a broadly consultative process already for the development of the
UN Framework, and continued this during his second mandate, which resulted in the Guiding
Principles. In both cases, that approach was had been included in the task set out by the
Commission for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council respectively. They had invited the
mandate holder to undertake a broad stakeholder oriented approach and to consult with companies,
states, inter-governmental organizations and civil society (UN 2005, UN 2008b). Yet, a formal
invitation to consult need not translate into active consultation, let alone into interaction between
diverse actors in various meetings. Business organizations had been consulted during the later
stages of the formulation of the Draft UN Norms, but in a way that led at least some but rather
influential organizations to characterize the process as insufficiently inclusive of business (Kinley,
Nolan and Zerial 2007: 40, Backer 2006: 321-327, Hearne 2004).
From the outset, the SRSG’s broadly consultative process included not only those governmental,
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors who are conventionally consulted in international
law-making on human rights, but also private sector actors, who in the pertinent context were

prospective duty-bearers. Due to the state-centrist structure of international law, the private sector is
normally excluded from international law-making. Civil society has long been included in
consultations for the development of human rights law, but this has generally been in the capacity
of representatives of victims and other holders of rights, not as bearers of duties. The integration of
business representatives into the process ensured in a pragmatic fashion that businesses
organisations were given ownership for the process of rule formation. By doing this, the SRSG
effectively heeded points that had been made decades ago by international law scholars who already
then saw a need for regulating business conduct and understood that involvement of business in the
rule-making process would cater for acceptance (Friedman 1964, Charney 1983). Obviously,
inviting specific actors (in casu business) into a rule-making process that aims to regulate these
actors conduct may entail a risk that the process of rule-making is diluted. Yet both Friedman and
Charney held that without being actively involved as participants in the rule-making process,
businesses might not wish to engage actively with the implementation of resulting rules. Related
observations on participation as an element in ‘process legitimacy’ in an international law rulemaking context in order to provide resulting rules with a compliance pull in place of a strong
enforcement system have been made by Thomas Franck (Franck 1990, see also Ruggie 2013: 168).
As explained by Buhmann and Ryngaert (2012), by strategic usage of the discursive construction of
rule-making within a reflexive law context, the SRSG succeeded in engaging even previously
strongly opposed business organisations in active participation leading to detailed guidance on
business conduct. Whether this will translate into an effective ‘compliance pull’ at the time of
writing remains to be assessed in detail.
The integration of business and other non-state actors into the process of rule formation was further
supported by a discursive strategy which articulated the interests of business as well as other
involved actors/stakeholders (Buhmann 2012a). This effectively functioned as an articulation of
drivers, which helped generate interaction among stakeholder to shape the drafting of the Principles
and achieve acceptance of the outcome. Once the battles on the UN Norms and the mandate for the
SRSG’s first term had been fought and the UN Framework adopted by the Human Rights Council,
the character of interaction as regards the goal and agenda for the Guiding Principles shifted
towards a sort of cooptation through which the outcome – the Guiding Principles – took on a metaregulatory effect with certain elements achieving a quasi-monopolistic position. A particularly
strong example of this is the influence which rule formation of the Guiding Principles had on the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as regards Due Diligence and remedial procedures
(below and discussed in detail in Buhmann (forthcoming)). Another example is the influence on
ISO 26000 that was exerted by the SRSG’s conceptions of the ‘sphere of influence’ and Human
Rights Due Diligence (Wood 2011).
As an effect of the interaction between non-state and state actors, the norm formation process
resulted in a detailed instrument comprised of 31 Guiding Principles, which spell out the
implications of the UN Framework provisions, emphasising operational aspects for states as well as
businesses. For each of the three Pillars, the Guiding Principles set out some foundational principles
and some operational principles. The two foundational and eight operational Principles on the State
Duty to Protect are followed by five foundational and nine operational Principles (11-15 and 16-24
respectively) on the Corporate Responsibility to Respects, which in turn are followed by Principles
on Access to Remedy, comprising one foundational and six operational Principles (25 and 26-31

respectively). Each of the Guiding Principles is accompanied by a detailed commentary contained
in the same report as the one which sets out the Principles.12
Although the Guiding Principles were formally authored by the SRSG, they resulted from a
collaborative process that involved not only the SRSG and his ‘team’ as an author collective, but
also a process in which partial conclusions were offered for debate through annual reports and
detailed elaborative addenda to the Human Rights Council. These were widely shared on the
internet and generating diverse responses, comments and suggestions from a range of actors,
including state, business and business associations, and civil society including academics. Perhaps
even more importantly, as in the case of the UN Framework this was a process in which elements
were tested with diverse audiences including multi-stakeholder meetings around the world as well
as specific civil society, business or (inter-)governmental groups before they were revised and
refined for incorporation into SRSG reports (Ruggie 2013, Buhmann 2012b). Although the SRSG
retained the final role as the editor and the person who selected what responses to include and how
to do so, as a result of the collaborative process the Guiding Principles may be perceived to build on
interaction between state and intergovernmental, business and civil society actors.
4.2.3. Implementation
As regards who or what interacts, the implementation of the Guiding Principles as a business
governance instrument is based on a combination of interactions between public and private
institutions, drivers and mechanisms. At the overall UN level, implementation is supported by the
establishment of a Working Group on Business and Human Rights, which is comprised of five
experts in the field and undertakes field visits, organizes surveys and engages with stakeholders,
including through the Annual Forum on Business and Human Rights. The Forum is a two-day event
taking place at the UN in Geneva and in particular targets non-state stakeholder from business, civil
society and academia, without however excluding state-actors. In addition, the Guiding Principles
are implemented through activities at the level of nation states as a result of the State duty to
protect, which is elaborated in the Principles’ Pillar One.
In practice, however, much of the implementation takes place through the Guiding Principles’
influence on or integration into other transnational business governance instruments. Interaction
with and between institutions such as the UN Global Compact and NCPs established under the
OECD Guidelines therefore plays a major role in the implementation. Interaction between the
SRSG and the OECD for the 2011 revision of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the
ISO 26000 formulation process played a major role as drivers and shapers for the integration of the
Guiding Principles towards implementation in the practices of business organizations as well as
state action under the State Duty to Protect: because the Guiding Principles have no enforcement
mechanism of their own and as noted above limited specific implementation modalities, the
potential for implementation through other transnational business governance instruments worked
as a strong driver for interaction and shaper of the form of interaction and its normative output.
Also among this category, interaction between the SRSG and the process of formulating the 2012
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards affects implementation of the
Guiding Principles through integration into environmental and social risk assessment. The IFC
Standard applies to all investment and advisory clients whose projects go through IFC's initial credit
review process (IFC 2012a, IFC 2012b). Through their own TBGI character, in particular their
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goals, actors and mechanisms, these institutions integrate the Guiding Principles as parts of their
own recurrent rule formation to be implemented, monitored, promoted and evaluated through their
own modalities. As in most cases those are more elaborate and build on detailed procedural rules,
they support and promote the implementation of the Guiding Principles.
In other words, the Guiding Principles ‘piggy-back’ themselves towards implementation through
interaction with related TBGI institutions albeit in fields that are only partially associated with
human rights. The piggy-backing is mutual: the solidity of the Guiding Principles as a form of new
international soft law endorsed by the Human Rights Council provides the TBGI schemes that
integrate elements of the Guiding Principles with an element of authority gleaned from the UN
system at the political and quasi-legislative level. This authority lends legitimacy to TBGI schemes
of less global (OECD), less formal (UN Global Compact) or less ‘law-like’ regulatory character
(ISO 26000). And the attention which has been paid by business organizations, civil society
organizations, intergovernmental organizations and governments to the Guiding Principles as solid
and authoritative advice on business conduct also shines on the institutions that have adopted
elements from the Principles. Sharing a common transnational governance task and a common
problem of navigating in an area of weak enforcement institutions, the Guiding Principles have
functioned as a driver and shaper of other CSR-related TBGI institutions to mutual benefit. The
OECD Guidelines’ integration of the Guiding Principles’ process oriented due diligence concept is
a particularly clear example of this: With the 2011 revision, OECD’s Guidelines not included a full
new human rights chapter in line with the Guiding Principles and integrated the due diligence
process. The also apply the Guiding Principles’ due diligence process requirement to most of the
issue areas covered by the Guidelines, including labour/industrial relations, environment and anticorruption. The OECD Guidelines and the grievance institutions called National Contact Points that
adhering states commit to establishing therefore function as a state-based implementation modality
for the Guiding Principles. The jurisprudence of the NCPs across the range of most of the OECD
Guidelines’ issues areas as well as guidance developed by the OECD may contribute to ongoing
elaboration of what is expected by businesses in terms of a due diligence process in accordance with
the UN Guidelines.
Such institutions function as mechanisms and pathways of interaction across TBGI schemes,
supporting the implementation of the Guiding Principles towards impacting business governance.
The OECD Guidelines’ integration of the Guiding Principles’ due diligence concept expresses a
type of mimicry (Guldbrandsen 2014), the effects of which have multiplied through the Guidelines’
application of the due diligence concept to most issue areas covered by the Guidelines.13 The Global
Compact’s referencing the Guiding Principles in its guidance materials on human rights draws on
the authority of the Guiding Principles while offering the Guiding Principles a path into the CSR
policies and activities of the more than 11,000 business organizations which are members of the
Global Compact.14 ISO 26000’s interaction with the SRSG on the concepts of ‘sphere of influence’
and (human rights) due diligence constituted a cognitive pathway of learning. This incorporated the
outcome of analyses made during the SRSG’s mandates and of interaction with diverse actors
13
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during those processes to identify interests related to business and human rights. These analyses
also included human rights related aspects of other ISO 26000 issues, and processes to avoid
business related human rights abuse. This fed into several sections of ISO 26000 while also
promoting the implementation of the Guiding Principles through the human rights section (3.6). In
most of these cases, the character of interaction was characterized by the cooptation of the norms
contained in the Guiding Principles.
For ISO 26000, however, the interactional struggle on the application of the concepts of ‘due
diligence’ or ‘sphere of influence’ carried an element of competition as regards regulatory
effectiveness and legitimacy. The SRSG with his team sought to influence the ISO process to
replace the ‘sphere of influence’ broadly by due diligence. In the end the ‘due diligence’ approach
prevailed as regards human rights issues while sphere of influence also remained in use for other
ISO issue areas (ISO 26000 clause 5, Wood 2011, Ruggie 2013). As a result, the convergence
between the Guiding Principles and ISO 26000 is less uniform than that between the Guiding
Principles and OECD’s Guidelines.
A good two years after the endorsement of the Principles, the major effects of the Guiding
Principle’s implementation oriented interaction with other TBGI schemes fall into two different
areas: a normative homogenization, and the regulatory capacity and performance of actors. None of
these fit squarely with the issues identified by Eberlein et al. (2014: 13-14), thereby underscoring
the broad spectrum of potential effects of transnational business governance interaction when statebased regulatory governance is included in the picture. In this case, the effect on other TBGI
institutions is strengthened by the authority which the Guiding Principles carry as a UN initiative.
The homogenization of transnational business governance norms occurs in two key areas. First, as
regards the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in accordance with the detailed
elaboration of the Guiding Principles. This homogenization effect is found with the OECD
Guidelines, IFC’s Performance Standards and ISO 26000 as well as several other TBGI instruments
in the CSR areas, including the UN Global Compact and policy instruments like the EU’s 2011
CSR Communication (EU 2011). Second, as regards due diligence in the particular sense and with
the particular elements and activities prescribed by the Guiding Principles. Contrary to static
oriented financial due diligence exercises such as those which business organizations and their
lawyers are familiar with, for example in the context of mergers or acquisitions, due diligence
exercised in accordance with the Guiding Principles is an ongoing process for the duration of a
particular activity. Human rights due diligence prescribed by the Guiding Principles should be
undertaken to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how a business organization addresses its
adverse human rights impacts. The process should include assessing actual and potential human
rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating
how impacts are addressed (Guiding Principle 17). The OECD Guidelines’ and ISO 26000’s
adoption of the Guiding Principles’ due diligence concept are particularly clear example of the
homogenization.
In terms of regulatory capacity and actors’ performance, the endorsement with which the Human
Rights Council as a UN institution provided the Guiding Principles as a transnational business
governance instrument functioned as a stamp of salience on other TBGI institutions. This lent
legitimacy to such other institutions, which allowed them to develop, expand or revise texts and as a
result, expand their audiences, members and therefore regulatory space. The OECD’s 2011 revision
of the Guidelines and ISO’s development of a detailed human rights Chapter in the ISO 26000 SR

Guidance Standard are among the most prominent examples. This effect is further evidenced by the
change over time, which in the case of the OECD Guidelines includes a revitalization of the NCPs
reflected in a number of organizational revisions (OECD 2011b, OECD 2012), the establishment of
a Forum on implementing due diligence in the supply chain for certain minerals and gold (OECD
website 2013a), and the development of a website and documents to provide due diligence guidance
for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OECD 2013,
OECD website 2013b).
4.2.4. Following up: Monitoring and information gathering, compliance promotion and
enforcement, and evaluation and review
At the time of writing a good two years after the adoption of the Guiding Principles it is still too
early for a detailed assessment of the interactional aspects a regards follow-up to the rule-making
and implementation, such as monitoring, compliance promotion and enforcement as well as review.
Those issues are all highly significant for a full appreciation of the transactional strategy deployed
by the Guiding Principles to follow up on the rule-formation by ensuring implementation in active
collaboration with and though other TBGI institutions. To complete the picture, this section offers a
brief overview but leaves detailed analysis for further study.
Just like the Guiding Principles interact with other TBGI institutions as regards implementation,
much of the monitoring and information gathering as regards the business responsibility to respect
human rights and remedies are exercised through the TBGI institutions with which the Guiding
Principles interact. Monitoring and information gathering interaction include the Global Compact
through its participants’ Communication on Progress and the OECD Guidelines through complaints
submitted to NCPs. Civil society organizations contribute in this respect, as they do in relation to
the state duty to protect and its effects on business conduct in home and host states. As is the case
for compliance promotion and enforcement, dimensions of interaction therefore largely resemble
what was stated above in relation to implementation
There is no formal procedure for an evaluation and review of the Guiding Principles. However,
several informal interactive processes may serve a similar objective. Key actors correspond to those
that were instrumental in convincing the UN system and its Human Rights Commission/Council of
the need to establish a transnational business governance instrument on business and human rights.
New forms of interaction, such as networks, may evolve. The endorsement of the Guiding
Principles is spurring a solidification of an emergent academic community comprising scholars of
regulatory and governance disciplines, who will be well placed to conduct research and analysis on
the effectiveness of the Guiding Principles, their implementation, monitoring, compliance
promotion and enforcement. With continued globalization and awareness of the human rights
impact of the global financial crisis, drivers and shapers are likely to include a combination of civil
society and market pressure and lessons and needs of the implementing TBG institutions. Given the
UN background, states may exercise significant influence to shape an evaluation and review as well
as the outcome. Host states of transnational enterprises may interact with home states with explicit
policies on CSR or business and human rights to establish a need for particular evaluations.
Through their regular review of states’ reports on human rights conditions, expert commissions
under UN human rights treaties may question the conduct of certain businesses, the adequacy of
states’ regulatory efforts to implement their duty to protect, and provide guidance for both states
and businesses to improve the understanding and application of the Guiding Principles to particular
situations or as regards specific human rights. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) may support this through analyses, which may involve interaction with

specific groups of victims of business-related human rights abuse, civil society, national human
rights institutions, or state bodies, such as authorities implementing national business regulation.
Comparison between business reports (such as Global Compact Communication of Progress
reports), NCPs (through cases reported on their websites or in the OECD Guidelines’ annual
reports), and states’ action to encourage and enforce the responsibility to respect human rights (such
as through states’ reports to UN Human Rights expert committees) may function as mechanisms
and pathways for evaluation and review. Analysis of experience with due diligence under the
OECD Guidelines in relation to other issues than human rights, as well as experience with ISO
26000 in relation to human rights due diligence and ‘sphere of influence’ for other areas may also
function as mechanisms for evaluation. The character of interaction may be diverse. In addition to
orchestration organized from within the UN (the Working Group on Business and Human Rights,
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and coordination, for example
between the OECD and its many NPCs at state level, it may come to include competition between
non-UN TBG institutions to seek to establish what model(s) of implementation of the Guiding
Principles are the most effective.
Contrary to some of the non-state based TBG schemes discussed by Eberlein et al. (2014, esp. at
15) and their colleagues (Guldbrandsen 2014; Haufler 2012), the Guiding Principles are not likely
to be revised frequently. Rather, as a UN soft law instrument, they themselves may be rather static
with dynamic guidance offered by expert committees or the OHCHR. More importantly from the
TBGI perspective, as a UN soft law instrument the Guiding Principles may evolve into a hard law
instrument, i.e. a treaty setting out standards of conduct for business organizations. This would take
broad agreement on the benefits of the standards contained in the Principles as a modality against
adverse business impact on society. Such agreement would need to be sufficient strong not be
counteracted through formal or informal interaction between actors opposed to a hardening of TBG
norms on business and human rights into binding standards of conduct. A repeat of the fate of the
Draft UN Norms would be a strong blow to the significance of state based regulatory governance in
the TBG field. By contrast, a continuation of the acceptance and spread of the norms of conduct
contained in the Guiding Principles through the forms of interaction with state and non-state bodies
that is sketched above would add significant regulatory perspectives to (international) state-based
governance as effective means of transnational business regulation. As is the case for the OECD
Guidelines’ broad adoption of due diligence, such regulation could go beyond human rights to
include other CSR-related issues.
5. Conclusion
As a regulatory instrument adopted by the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Guiding Principles
are unique in several respects of relevance transnational business governance interaction. This
includes the multi-stakeholder development of this UN Human Rights instrument, which actively
included business organizations as potential duty-holders; the normative combination of State duties
and business responsibilities which informs the Guiding Principles; and the significant normative
influence on other TBGI schemes within a brief time span of the adoption of the Guiding Principles.
Importantly, it also includes the way in which the Guiding Principles as an instrument without
detailed built-in implementation or enforcement modalities work through such other schemes. This
applies to Global Compact Guidance and reporting and to the OECD Guidelines’ broad
recommendations of due diligence. It applies to the National Contact Points as complaints handling
institutions with extraterritorial reach, and to financial activities supported by IFC. Through these

and the influence on ISO 26000, a transmission of elements of the UN Guiding Principles into
private business governance may take place which may be applied by companies and in supply
chain management across the world.
The application of the TBGI framework to the UN Guiding Principles demonstrates how nonenforceable transnational business governance is not only deployed by private or public-private
organisations, but also public institutions. This applies even to institutions which like the UN
Human Rights Council have a quasi-legislative role. Analysis of the Guiding Principles as
interactional business governance suggests that this form of governance is capable of migrating
from deployment by specialised private or public-private groups in specific sectors or regions, to
becoming adopted by public institutions to regulate global sustainability concerns. The implications
of this migration of experimentalist forms of governance from the private to the public sphere are
potentially huge in terms of contributions to global regulation of sustainable development. The
influence which the Guiding Principles have had on other TBGI instruments of various degrees of
private and public dominance (from ISO 26000 through IFC’s Performance Standards to the Global
Compact) indicates the potential of international institutions regulating global sustainability
concerns through transnational business governance and its interaction with other TBGI schemes
for their implementation and enforcement. Offering a way around the political and institutional
constraints of state-centrist international law, the approach may be deployed for the regulation of
other sustainability issues that are affected by business: climate change, water and land usage, food
security, and space exploration and exploitation are all potential candidates for transnational
business governance. Their effective regulation requires public international law- and policymakers to go beyond the state-centrist focus and actively interact with other public, public-private
and private business governance schemes.
From a pragmatic perspective that does not disregard governance gaps but also does not accept the
adverse impact on society that results from such gaps, engaging and regulating the private sector is
a modality for international organisations like the UN to implement sustainability related objectives
to complement or supplement the obligations of states. This is particularly salient when states lack
the will to implement their international obligations in national law (leading to governance gaps).
The TBGI approach shows the UN Guiding Principles as a bridge-builder that pragmatically cuts
across the public and private regulatory spheres, not only drawing on both in combinations in order
to reduce adverse business impact on society, but as indicated weaving into other regulatory
initiatives in both fields. Due to the influence that the Principles have already had on regulatory
business governance not only as regards but also beyond human rights, insight into the dimensions
and components of the interactional aspects of this instrument and its implementation offers
significant contributions to the literature on regulation, governance, business ethics and CSR.
By combining a range of actors, drivers, mechanisms and forms of interaction, transnational
business governance interaction offers governmental and intergovernmental authorities
opportunities to shape private sector action outside their formal regulatory boundaries. The TBGI
approach to the Guiding Principles illustrates that diverse forms of interaction and components of
regulatory governance offer opportunities not only to address governance gaps, but also to
implement specific public policy goals beyond the traditional ‘carefully policed boundaries’ of
national or international, public or private governance. With CSR no longer only ‘beyond law’ –
one of the key impacts of the Guiding Principles, as evidenced for example by the EU’s 2011 CSR
definition (EU 2011) - regulators may even deploy this concept to go beyond the minimum

requirements of enforceable law by incorporating its normative drive into novel forms of governing
business conduct.
Further research on the TBGI aspects of the Guiding Principles could uncover the regulatory
perspectives through detailed analysis of the ways in which the Guiding Principles influence other
TBGI schemes as well as sector-wise or regional public, public-private or private business
governance. Further research perspectives on potential for regulation of global sustainability
concerns include a detailed elucidation of transnational governance features relating to the rulemaking process of the Guiding Principles, and analysis of the effectiveness of implementation
though interaction with other TBGI schemes. Such insight may be applied in other public or publicprivate regulatory initiatives targeting business governance.
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